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Abstract
The tuna fishing industry’s increasing regulatory restrictions on the number of
FADs per vessel is forcing companies to rethink their fishing practices to ensure their
continued profitability. Despite these expanding constraints, and although many
studies have been published on the use of FADs and their implications, to date
there has been little research on how to help the tuna fishing industry optimize its
procedures. Based on real data and using the game theory approach, we suggest a
new collaborative method of employing FADs that involves their use between vessels,
and we demonstrate that sharing FADs optimizes the use of fuel and time for entire
fleets. Our findings show that, with the correct incentives, all stakeholders, including
the company, the skipper, and even the environment, can achieve mutually improved
results by sharing information.
Keywords
FAD restrictions, Tuna fishing industry, Economic incentives for sharing, Fuel consump-
tion reduction, Game theory, Sustainability
1 Introduction
The performance of the tropical tuna fishing industry is, more than ever, bound to the
use of drifting fish aggregating devices (FADs), the use of which has become widespread
since 1991 (Ariz, Delgado, Fonteneau, Gonzales Costas, & Pallare´s, 1992). With the
scope of new regulations affecting the tuna industry, this paper furnishes a study from a
perspective that prioritizes efficiency, imposing the theoretical framework of game theory.
The global tuna fishery is one of the largest in the world. The most widely used
and fastest-growing fishing gear for targeting tuna is the purse seine (PS). Tropical PS
started to operate in the Atlantic Ocean in the 1960s and were introduced into the
Indian Ocean in the early 1980s. PS fishers principally target skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus
pelamis, Scombridae) schools, but also schools of small juvenile bigeye (Thunnus obesus,
Scombridae) and yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares, Scombridae) (Phillips et al., 2017).
These species tend to gravitate toward objects floating on the surface of the ocean (Castro,
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Santiago, & Santana-Ortega, 2001; P. Fonteneau & Pianet, 2000). The aggregate behavior
of tuna toward floating objects was first observed in the context of tuna interacting
with natural floating objects (FOBs) emerging from river mouths. Aiming to simulate
FOBs, fishermen started deploying large numbers of their own FOBs. These human-made
drifting FADs generally consisted of bamboo, stabilized in the surface currents by large
pieces of netting hanging below; these early FADs were able to stay adrift for up to two
months (Me´nard, Ste´quert, Rubin, Herrera, & Marchal, 2000). It is worth noting here
that there are two kind of FADs: anchored FADs, or Payaos, and drifting FADs. This
study refers exclusively to drifting FADs (FADs).
The tuna fishing industry targets a mixture of free-swimming schools (FS) and of
drifting FAD schools. The main advantage of FADs for fishers is that they increase
the catchability of tuna, relative to sets on FS (Guillotreau, Salladarre´, Dewals, &
Dagorn, 2011). Even fleets that have traditionally relied on FS sets are moving towards
FAD-based strategies (Lopez, Moreno, Sancristobal, & Murua, 2014). The increasing
use of FADs resulted in subsequent increases in PS catches per unit effort (CPUE) over
time (A. Fonteneau, Chassot, & Bodin, 2013; Griffiths, Allain, Hoyle, Lawson, & Nicol,
2019; Maufroy et al., 2016). In parallel, the extensive use of FADs by the PS fishery
industry increases the possibility of a number of negative impacts, including a reduction
in yield per recruitment of two target tuna species (bigeye and yellowfin), increased
bycatch and perturbation of the pelagic ecosystem balance, and alteration of the normal
movements of the species associated with FADs (Bromhead, Foster, Attard, Findlay, &
Kalish, 2003; P. Fonteneau & Pianet, 2000; Holmes, Hanich, & Soboil, 2019); such effects,
however, are difficult to estimate with any accuracy (Lopez et al., 2014). From a research
perspective, there is reason to be hopeful; although, at present, FADs are only used for
fishing purposes, they can also serve scientific objectives (Brehmer et al., 2019; Moreno
et al., 2016).
Be that as it may, due to the increased use of FADs, recent efforts from regional
fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) have given rise new regulations on the
number of FADs that each PS can manage. These increasing regulatory restrictions, in
conjunction with other constrains that affect Global marine fisheries (e.g., those aimed at
minimizing bycatch and discards (Escalle et al., 2019)), force companies to rethink their
fishing practices and optimize the use of FADs to ensure their profitability. With these
newly implemented restrictions, it is essential that the tuna fishing industry rethinks their
fishing practices and optimize the use of FADs to ensure continued profitability.Although
many studies have been published regarding the use of FADs and their implications, little
research exists on how to help the tuna fishing industry optimize its fishing practices
(Groba, Sartal, & Va´zquez, 2015, 2018).
In this context, our work describes a new way for tuna fishing companies to employ
FADs that involves sharing them between vessels, and we demonstrate that sharing
FADs maximizes fuel efficiency and use of time, while decreasing CO2 emissions across
entire fleets. First, with a foundation in game theory and, in particular, the well-being
assessment, two different theoretical mechanisms were developed: one without compen-
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sation and the other with compensation. The first mechanism (without compensation)
explains why many vessels do not like sharing FADs, and the second mechanism (with
compensation), shows an equilibrium where all vessels want to share FADs. Second, this
theoretical approach is evaluated empirically with real data through simulations, and the
expected result emerges: There is a situation in which all players, including the company
and skippers, win, proving that best-route optimization occurs when the information
gleaned from FADs is shared between vessels. Data for this study come from different
groups of tuna vessels retrieving their FADs in the Indian Ocean during April 2017.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a review of the literature.
Section 3 describes the game theory approach; Section 4 introduces the data, the experi-
mental design and discusses the results; and finally, Section 5 concludes by highlighting
the paper’s main contributions and implications.
2 Background
The use of FADs by PS has evolved over the years to improve fishing efficiency. The
FAD itself has undergone improvements in shape, materials, and net length, both to drift
with the currents of interest and also to minimize the risk of entangling turtles, sharks,
and other non-targeted species (Filmalter, Capello, Deneubourg, Cowley, & Dagorn,
2013). FADs have also evolved technologically. From the beginning, the use of artificial
FADs has relied on tracking buoys to know where the FADs are. The first buoys were
radio-based, and each vessel used secret frequencies to locate its own floating objects
(Me´nard et al., 2000). In 1996, GPS buoys with a virtually unlimited range appeared on
the market and positively affected the size of fishing areas (Moro´n, Areso, & Pallares,
2001).
During the 2000s, satellite technologies, including Inmarsat D+ and Iridium SBD,
became affordable alternatives to the buoys (Moreno, Dagorn, Sancho, & Itano, 2007). The
use of satellite communications was a revolution for the tuna fishing industry because,
although each buoy had a monthly airtime fee, satellite communication technology
brought many advantages, relative to the previous-radio-based buoy technology. These
advantages included the ability to receive FAD positions at any distance and to change
the configuration of the buoys from the vessel. Remote detection of satellite-tracked
FADs often allows purse seiners to move directly toward a buoy, even at night, avoiding,
or significantly reducing the time once required to actually search for and locate the
buoys by sight (Gaertner et al., 2016). Further, satellite buoys did not use large carbon
antennas for transmission like the radio buoys did. As such, satellite buoys were difficult
to detect by radar, making them less likely to be stolen, which was a big advantage over
radio buoys. In any case, most FADs are easily identified by other vessels due to the
birds that are so frequently positioned above the FADs and identifiable, even at great
distances, by bird radars. This phenomenon accounts for the majority of FAD losses for
a given owner, which are due to appropriation by other fishing vessels (around 50% of
the FADs in the Indian ocean) (Moreno et al., 2018). Finally, satellite communication
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technology provided vessels the capacity to share their FADs’ positions with other vessels,
allowing vessels to collaborate with the aim of improving their fishing efficiency.
The last major improvement to the buoys was the development of echo-sounders, which
were introduced around 2008 to monitor the amount of biomass aggregated beneath
the FAD (Lopez et al., 2014). This new technological device reduced the searching
time (i.e., enables remote identification of FADs with associated tunas) and provided
new information for fishers to learn more about the location and behavior of tuna and
other associated species. Several indicators suggest that echo-sounder buoys may be as
important or more important than other significant technological developments in the
fishery industry, such as the introduction of sonar in the vessels (Lopez et al., 2014).
The echo-sounder technology embedded in the buoy was a game-changer for the
tropical tuna industry, in terms of optimization. Before this improvement, PS traveled
from FAD to FAD, searching for tuna. After the introduction of the echo-sounder
tuna buoys, they only traveled to FADs that had fish beneath, which improved their
fishing efficiency by potentially saving time and fuel and by discovering new fishing areas.
The latest improvements to echo-sounder technology are aiming toward an ability to
discriminate among tuna species (Moreno, Boyra, Sancristobal, Itano, & Restrepo, 2019).
Consequently, there was an increasing acquisition of FADs by PS. For example, in the
Atlantic Ocean (A. Fonteneau, Chassot, & Gaertner, 2015), the total number of FADs
increased 730%, from 1, 175 FADs active in January 2007 to 8, 575 in August 2013. In the
Indian Ocean this number increased 458%, from 2, 250 FADs in October 2007 to 10, 300
FADs in September 2013 (Maufroy et al., 2016). This increase has resulted in regulation
from RFMOs of the number of FADs that a PS can manage, for example, in the Indian
Ocean, where the number of FADs, as defined in Resolution 19/02, will be no more
than 300 active instrumented buoys and 500 annual acquisitions of instrumented buoys
per vessel (IOTC circular 2019). Currently, this limitation is also being imposed in the
Atlantic Ocean through the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas (ICCAT), and all indicators predict that the Pacific Ocean will follow the same
initiative via the Inter-American-Tropical-Tuna-Commission (IATTC) (P. Fonteneau &
Pianet, 2000), as well as the Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).
It is noteworthy that skippers have important economic incentives, depending on
how many tons they fish, but it should also be acknowledged that FAD fishing currently
represents their unique way of increasing catches (especially of skipjack) due to existent
limitations on the free schools catches. Meanwhile, tuna fishing companies or firms
pay these incentives with, aiming to maximize the number of fished tons of the whole
company. The costs of the entire fleet are assumed by the firm, including salaries, goods,
and fuel, among other expenses.
In terms of fishing management and efficiency, Salas and Gaertner (2004) showed
how essential it is for effective management to know the dynamics of the fisheries. Bez,
Walker, Gaertner, Rivoirard, and Gaspar (2011) used a vessel monitoring system (VMS)
to measure tuna fishing efforts to study and quantify the spatial dynamic of the tropical
tuna PS fishing activity. In terms of fuel consumption, Parker, Va´zquez-Rowe, and
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Tyedmers (2015) analyzed fuel performance and the carbon footprint of the global PS
tuna fleet. Meanwhile Hospido and Tyedmers (2005) employed life cycle assessment (LCA)
to quantify the scale and importance of emissions that result from the range of industrial
activities associated with contemporary Spanish PS fisheries. Gaertner and Dreyfus-Leon
(2004) analyzed the shape of the relationship between CPUE and abundance in a tuna
PS fishery, using a simulation that hinged on artificial neural networks. In terms of fuel
consumption efficiency, Groba et al. (2015) showed how important it can be to optimize
the route of a tuna vessel retrieving FADs. In the case of tropical tuna fishery efficiency,
the literature is scarce. For this reason, and with recent RFMO regulations in mind, the
proper use of FADs by tuna vessels is a matter of great importance for tuna fisheries.
In this paper, the behaviors of tuna fishing vessels that use FADs are studied for the
first time from the point of view of game theory. Indeed, through real-data simulations,
this paper shows that there are policies changing the way that tuna vessels work with
FADs. If tuna fishing companies settle into capitalizing on the opportunities provided by
new policies, they may see improvements in their overall efficiency.
3 The tuna fishing vessels problem: A game theory ap-
proach
3.1 The tuna fishing vessels problem
Tuna skippers may be driven by important economic incentives that are directly dependent
on how many tons they fish. Such incentives also depend on the tuna ton price (Jeon,
Reid, & Squires, 2008). Because of this, it is important for skippers to maximize the
number of tons fished; the more a vessel fishes in less time, the better. Depending on
the season and the ocean, purse seiners can target either FADs or free-swimming schools
(FS), but skippers usually prefer a high probability of positive sets with small catches
(typical with FADs) to a low probability of positive sets with higher catches (typical with
FS) (Floch et al., 2012; Guillotreau et al., 2011; Lopez et al., 2015; Squires & Kirkley,
1999). It is important to note the geographical movement pattern of FADs over time,
where some of them can move outside the potential fishing zone of the vessel or the
entire PS fleet. A tuna vessel faces, for instance, an optimization problem that hinges on
determining which route to follow using its FADs, which are drifting in the ocean and in
its fishing zone (Groba et al., 2015).
We suppose that FS fishing can happen at any moment a vessel detects birds via
radar or some other sign of a fishable free-swimming school. This, however, is something
we cannot predict. Nevertheless, optimizing the route to retrieve a company’s FADs
also offers vessels the same opportunities to FS fishing as any other non-optimal FAD
retrieval strategy.
Each vessel is limited to a certain number of FADs it can use to fish (Moreno et al.,
2018). This limit depends on the RFMO that has authority over the area in which the
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tuna vessel belongs. A tuna vessel may share its FAD’s information among groups of two
to five vessels, depending on the size of the company (Groba et al., 2018). It should be
noted that, usually, each company has several vessels (ranging from two or three to ten
or more). In fact, more than 94% of the European companies that operate in the Indian
Ocean have two or more vessels 1. In these cases, FADs are shared among the group of
fishing vessels, and incentives are shared as well. Groups of vessels that fish together are
also sharing confidences, which is one reason they are typically small.
By contrast, firms want to maximize the overall company profits, which means that
vessels have to fish as much as they can and that variable costs, such as fuel, crew costs,
and equipment must be minimized. This also requires the optimization of the fishing
of n vessels (vessels that the firm owns) with m FADs (the sum of FADs from all the
vessels of the company).
In most of the practical cases, the costs associated with vessels (like fuel, which is
the one we consider) are paid by the firm. Besides, the skipper has a salary that can be
increased by bonuses that depend on the amount of tuna fished. Thus, the utility of the
firm depends directly on the amount of tuna fished and the fuel cost. Nevertheless, the
utility of the skipper depends directly on the amount of tuna fished but not on the fuel
cost (which is also paid by the firm). Given these circumstances, the direct incentives for
fuel cost minimization are associated with the firm but not with the skippers. Facing
this situation, a new scenario for analysis and improvement appears, hinging on how to
maximize the profits for all agents. The aim of this paper is to study this equilibrium
in detail, with real data and explain how and why tuna fisheries currently operate.
Further, this paper presents a new proposal, centered on FAD-sharing policies, which
shows improvements for both individual and collective performance and reduction of
CO2 emissions.
3.2 A game theory approach
We introduce a theoretical model to facilitate the study of the previously described
problem. We considered two different mechanisms by which the firm can incentive vessels
to share FADs. When vessels share FADs, the total distance traveled by all vessels is
reduced, which produces cost savings for the firm. Our analysis was conducted through
a non-cooperative game with incomplete information, following the model of Aumann
(1976), which we believe is the most suitable for this case. We also consider the Bayesian
Nash equilibria (BNE) (Nash, 1951), the most standard solution for these types of games
(Harsanyi, 1967).
Let N = {1, . . . , n} the set of tuna vessels, briefly, vessels. We assume that all vessels
work for the same firm, which we denote by f .
There is a finite number of FADs (or buoys) that have been assigned to the vessels
following some criteria. We assume that each FAD is assigned to a single vessel. Thus,
1Information extracted from IOTC Record of Authorised Vessels: https://www.iotc.org/vessels
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each vessel i ∈ N has an initial endowment bi =
{(
bki
)}ni
k=0
=
{(
xki , y
k
i
)}ni
k=0
. The
interpretation is the following: Vessel i has been assigned to handle ni FADs
{
b1i , . . . , b
ni
i
}
.
The position of each FAD k with k = {1, . . . , ni} is given by
(
xki , y
k
i
)
where xki denotes
the latitude and yki the longitude. We further denote by b
0
i =
(
x0i , y
0
i
)
the position of
vessel i at the beginning of the process. We also assume that FADs are numbered in the
order of their recovery by vessel i. Namely, vessel i is located in position
(
x0i , y
0
i
)
. Thus,
it moves to FAD b1i and recovers the tuna in that FAD. Next, vessel i moves to position
FAD b2i and so on.
Therefore, we make the following assumptions:
• Each vessel knows the position of all FADs to which has been assigned. No vessels
know the location of the FADs assigned to other vessels.
• In the theoretical model, we assume that each vessel incurs a cost c per mile traveled
between FADs. This cost is paid by the firm. In our simulations, we compute c by
assuming that the average vessel speed is 15 knots. Thus, we estimate a fuel cost
of $29 US per nautical mile to travel between FADs.
• Vessels cannot know in advance the amount of tuna they will find at each FAD. We
denote by q the expected amount of tuna by FAD. We denote by qki the amount of
tuna recovered by skipper i in FAD bki . These amounts can be known only after
fishing.
In our simulations we take q = 6.1 tons for every skipper i and every FAD bki . This
value supposes that a tuna vessel fishes, on average, 9.000 tons per year, works 295
days during the year and visits 5 FADs per working day. Nevertheless, any other
quantity of tons per FAD can be used in the simulations.
• Each vessel i cannot know in advance the amount of time tki it will take to recover
the tuna of FAD bki .
In our simulations, we assume that tki is 3 hours for every vessel i and every FAD
bki .
• Each vessel i can also fish tuna by free schools (FS) or by the poaching of others’
FADs. Let fs(bi) denote the amount of tuna vessel i obtains by FS when it is
trying to recover FADs in bi.
Similarly, let po(bi) denote the amount of tuna vessel i obtains by FS or FADs
poaching when it is trying to recover its own FADs in bi.
In the Appendix, we will prove that our results hold, independently of the values
of the fishing in FS or FAD poaching. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, in our
simulations we assume that both are 0.
• Each skipper receives a price p corresponding to each amount of tuna fished.
In our simulations, we consider several values for p.
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Once vessel (skipper) i has recovered all of its FADs, the utility obtained is computed
as the amount fished, multiplied by the price paid by the firm. Namely,
p
(
ni∑
k=1
qki + fs(bi) + po(bi)
)
The utility of the firm is
(pf − p)
(
n∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
qki +
n∑
i=1
fs(bi) +
n∑
i=1
po(bi)
)
− c
n∑
i=1
d (bi)
where d (bi) is the distance traveled by vessel i to recover all FADs in bi. Namely, the
firm pays a unit price of p to every vessel and sells the fish at the price pf . Additionally,
the firm must pay costs associated with the travel of the vessels.
As usual, the game theoretical model considers direct utilities, which can be measured
objectively. Of course, the firm and the skippers may have other incentives that do
not appear in our model: the welfare of the crew, the CO2 emissions, the profitability
of the vessel and the firm, and so on. Since the fuel cost is paid by the firm, skippers
do not have a direct incentive to share their FADs to minimize the distance traveled.
Nevertheless, the firm has incentives to incentivise the skippers to do this. If the fuel
cost is reduced, then the total utility of the firm will be increased.
We consider two possible mechanisms by which firms can induce skippers to share
their FADs. We model such mechanisms as two games with incomplete information
following Aumann’s model. Additionally, we study the Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE)
of both games, which provide predictions of the behavior of rational agents when facing
such situations.
In the Appendix, we theoretically study both mechanisms, and we formally present
the games to model both mechanisms. We also compute the BNE associated with both
mechanisms (Propositions 1 and 2).
For now, we present the results in a more informal way. The basic idea of both
mechanisms is the same. First, the vessels or skippers decide independently whether they
want to share their FADs. If a vessel refuses to share, then this vessel fishes with its own
FADs. For the vessels that agree to share, the firm redistributes their FADs among the
cooperating vessels. Next, every vessel fishes in its reassigned FADs.
Mechanism 1: Reassigning FADs without compensation. The firm pays the
skippers according to the FADs each vessel has been assigned. Suppose that vessel i
initially had 20 FADs, decided to share its FADs, and was reassigned to 18 FADs. The
firm pays skipper i according to the amount of fish obtained by the 18 reassigned FADs.
If vessel i is reassigned to the same or more FADs than it initially had, then vessel i is
also paid according to the number of assigned FADs.
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In Proposition 1 of the Appendix, we theoretically study this mechanism. Here we
discuss the practical implications of Proposition 1. According to part (a), if each vessel
decides not to share its FADs (as in Example 2 of the Appendix), then we have a BNE,
and the firm cannot save in fuel. In other cases (as in Example 1 of the Appendix), there
may exist a different BNE, wherein some vessels share FADs and the firm saves fuel costs.
By part (b) of Proposition 1, we realize that the utility of each skipper i in any BNE
will always be the same and coincide with the utility skipper i obtains when it does
not share FADs. This result is independent of the number of FADs, the position of the
FADs, and the information the vessels have on the position of the FADs. Thus, skipper i
does not have an incentive to share its FADs under any circumstance, because skipper i
cannot improve its expected utility by sharing instead of not sharing. If skipper i shares
its FADs, it may be the case that skipper i receives more FADs than it initially had, but
it may also receive less. The average will be the same.
Our theoretical results prove that under this mechanism, skippers do not have
incentives to share their FADs under any circumstance. This helps explain why tuna
vessels work alone or in small groups. Nevertheless, this mechanism is not the most
beneficial for the firm.
Mechanism 2: Reassigning FADs with compensation. The firm offers a
guarantee to skippers who share their FADs to pay, at minimum, in accordance with the
original number of FADs the vessel was assigned. For example, suppose that vessel i
initially had 20 FADs, decided to share its FADs, and is reassigned with 18 FADs. The
firm pays skipper i the same amount that vessel i would have received if it had recovered
2 more FADs. If vessel i is reassigned with the same or more FADs than it initially was
assigned, it will be paid according to the number of reassigned FADs.
In Proposition 2 of the Appendix, we theoretically study this mechanism. Here, we
discuss the practical implications of Proposition 2. According to part (a), we know that
there is a BNE when every skipper decides not to share its FADs. The same applies to
Mechanism 1. Per part (c), there is also a BNE when every skipper shares its FADs and
the firm reorganizes all the FADs optimally. Further, the utility of the firm and each
skipper under part (c) is greater than or equal to when no vessels share FADs.
We then asked the following: when is the BNE of part (c) different from that of part
(a)? We also sought to determine the extent of these differences. In Example 3 of the
Appendix, both BNE are essentially the same. Thus, from a theoretical point of view,
the answer to our question is that it depends on the characteristics of the problem. We
then offered (in the next section) a practical answer to both questions. After developing
simulations based on real data, our results showed that, in all cases studied, the BNE
of part (c) was different from that of part (a). Additionally, both were quite different
in terms of utility obtained by the skippers and the firm. In this case, the firm clearly
benefits more than the skippers.
Part (b) of Proposition 2 says the following: Suppose that skipper i decides between
sharing or not sharing its FADs. Independent of the position of its FADs or the decision
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taken by other skippers, the expected utility obtained by sharing its FADs is never
smaller than the expected utility obtained by not sharing its FADs. This means that
the Bayesian Nash equilibria we should observe, in practice, is the one in which every
skipper shares its FADs. Thus, with Mechanism 2, every skipper has incentives to share
its FADs, and this mechanism is also suitable for the firm.
4 Data and results
In this section, we articulate a design for an experiment that, based on data from the
movement of FADs, assesses the theoretical propositions made in the previous section.
It is worth recalling that we used real data from different tuna fishing companies. To
test our model exclusively for scientific purposes, Marine Instruments provided us with
anonymous real data from several tuna vessels fishing in the FAO2 capture zone no. 51
(Eastern Indian Ocean) from April 9 to April 23, 2017. Figure 1 shows the FAO no. 51
area (in red) and the area of real data provided by Marine Instruments (in green).
Figure 1: Experiment design
It is worth emphasizing here three key issues regarding our sample. On the one
hand, although in free-school fishing, there appear to be some months that are more
favorable, fishing with FAD does not present the same seasonal disparity (A. Fonteneau
et al. (2013); Maufroy et al. (2016)). On the other hand, we regard a month of study as
a sufficient time period since it is a fairly common fishing period (Groba et al., 2015).
Finally, regarding the number of boats, our data sample comes from a tuna fishing
company composed of 3 vessels (i.e., 3 skippers) with 20 FADs per vessel. The decision
to use 3 boats has a dual purpose: first, it is one of the most common ways to work
the tuna vessels; second, it was the simplest (and most parsimonious) way to approach
2Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
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our objective: ”demonstrate the potential to share.” Furthermore, it is worth recalling
that the chosen conditions are intended to represent the most demanding conditions,
as the potential savings generated derive from fuel savings (Groba et al. (2015); Groba
et al. (2018)). As these authors point out, these savings grow when fishing campaigns
increase (i.e., higher number of FADs) and with greater distribution complexity (i.e.,
with a greater number of vessels).
This information was gathered randomly using the MSB software, a platform for
receiving and visualizing buoy data, from Marine Instruments. We performed 10 mea-
surements in each experiment, varying the positions of the FADs and the vessels, to
obtain representative mean values for each case study. We suppose that tuna vessels
navigate at 15 knots and, for simplicity, the expected average of tuna by FAD is 6.1 tons3,
with $29 per nautical mile the cost of fuel at this speed. All these working conditions
are represented in Table 1 and were obtained from Marine’s historical records for vessels
working in this area during the last decade:
Table 1: Experiment assumptions
Description Value
Number of vessels 3
FADs per vessel 20
Vessel speed 15 knots
Fishing time 3 hours
Tons beneath each FAD 6.1
Cost per ton $1, 400
Fuel cost per mile $29
Skipper benefit 10%
It should also be noted that, for correct interpretation of the results, all skippers
have variable benefits that depend on the quantity of fish they catch. While this value
may be different from one company to another, we have supposed an average benefit of
about 10% of the total amount of tuna fished, which is based on the average tuna stock
price. Although the companies did not give us this information, they confirmed that the
supposed percentage is a reasonable value. Of course, this value should be used with
caution, given wide variability of tuna prices across species, as well as over the course of
the year or in different years. We also want to note that this percentage does not affect
our qualitative results (namely, both the company and the skippers attain more benefits
with this new procedure). For the sake of simplicity, we paid no attention to the firm’s
fixed expenditures, such as crew costs, supplies, fishing licenses, etc.
Considering these conditions and following the same structure as in the previous
3We try to study the decision of the skipper in some moment of the time, given the information the
skipper has at such moment. We assume that the skipper knows the number of FADs to which has
been assigned but cannot know in advance the amount of tuna at each FAD. Thus, we consider that the
amount of tuna of each FAD is 6.1 tons, the expected average.
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theoretical section, a total of three different scenarios were considered. The first scenario
(Table 2) describes the current situation in which the skippers do not share their FADs.
In the second scenario (Table 3), the three skippers share the FADs without compen-
sation. Finally, in the last scenario (Table 4), the same situation is proposed, but with
compensation for the skippers to share. Next, each of these three situations is analyzed
in detail.
In the first scenario, we assumed that the skippers did not share their FADs. In
these conditions, therefore, each skipper only knows the position of their own FADs.
The results obtained are shown in Table 2, where we can observe the money earned
by each skipper (vessel) and the money earned by the firm (owner of the three tuna
vessels) within the conditions (tons per FAD, cost per ton, fuel cost, etc.) previously
illustrated in Table 1. To obtain a representative average value (Avg.), we have repeated
each simulation 10 times to represent different FADs situations. It is worth recalling that
we assume the same quantity of fish beneath each FAD. Therefore, the expected amount
of money earned for each skipper is the same for each simulation, but it is not for the
firm, because totals also depend on how many miles the vessels navigate, and the firm’s
benefits depend not only on the amount of tuna captured, but also on the fuel spent; the
more miles traveled, the fewer benefits for the firm.
Table 2: Current way of working: Vessels do not share their FADs
Skipper 1 Skipper 2 Skipper 3 Ship owner
1 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 248,267
2 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 247,448
3 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 244,741
4 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 255,185
5 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 255,032
6 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 256,515
7 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 258,642
8 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 255,185
9 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 244,166
10 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 251,943
Avg. $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 251,712
In the second scenario (Table 3), we assume that the three skippers (vessels) agree to
share their FADs, so the firm makes an optimal distribution of the FADs and assigns
them in a smart way from the office to the vessels. This means that, sometimes, one
vessel can have 20 FADs, sometimes more and sometimes less. Table 3 shows these
results, and we can observe that skippers 1 and 2 achieve greater benefits than skipper 3
because, on average, they had more FADs during the simulations.
In this scenario, the firm would obtain important benefits because of the fuel saved by
this smart distribution of FADs, reaching 8.5% improvement compared to the previous
scenario. However, the total benefits of the skippers does not change. Skipper 1 improves
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4.3%, skipper 2 improves 0.8% but skipper 3 decreases 5.1% (compared to Table 1, which
reflects current fishing methods). These results confirm the theoretical results we have
seen in the previous section. Skippers have no direct incentives to share their FADs
with other vessels because the expected benefit of a skipper who shares his FADs is the
same as that of a skipper who doesn’t share his FADs. Thus, as there is no expectation
of improvement, it seems very likely that the skippers would not want to take risks
and continue working only with their own FADs. Seen from the global point of view
of the company (and shareholders), however, the best scenario would involve sharing.
Our empirical results corroborate the theoretical assumptions described above and help
explain why many tuna vessels work alone. Nevertheless, this mechanism is not the most
suitable for the firm.
Table 3: Mechanism 1: Reassigning FADs without compensation
Skipper 1 Skipper 2 Skipper 3 Ship owner
1 $ 17,818 $ 16,121 $ 16,970 $ 281,716
2 $ 17,818 1 $ 6,970 $ 16,121 $ 266,843
3 $ 19,515 $ 15,273 $ 16,121 $ 269,936
4 $ 16,970 $ 16,970 $ 16,970 $ 276,557
5 $ 17,818 $ 16,121 $ 16,970 $ 285,337
6 $ 16,970 $ 18,667 $ 15,273 $ 258,980
7 $ 17,309 $ 18,723 $ 14,877 $ 269,586
8 $ 17,164 $ 19,063 $ 14,683 $ 270,121
9 $ 19,515 $ 16,121 $ 15,273 $ 279,064
10 $ 16,121 $ 16,970 $ 17,818 $ 272,243
Avg. $ 17,702 $ 17,100 $ 16,107 $ 273,038
Diff 4.3% 0.8% -5.1% 8.5%
In the third scenario, the firm changes its strategy of incentives for the skippers,
as shown in Proposition 2 (see Mechanism 2: Reassigning FADs with compensation in
Section 3). In this scenario, the firm guarantees pay to vessels that share FADs, at least
according to the number of FADs the vessel initially had. In other words, when a skipper
has fewer FADs assigned than the average, he or she is automatically compensated by
the firm. For example, when a skipper has 2 FADs fewer than would otherwise have been
the situation (i.e., 20), the company will still pay for 20 FADs, so there is not any risk for
the skipper. However, when the skipper has more FADs assigned than the average (for
instance, 21), he or she will keep them, fishing more, and the quantity of fish expected
for each vessel will be more than in the first scenario. With this policy of incentives, it
seems logical to expect the bosses to be encouraged to collaborate since everybody wins.
In fact, as was theoretically proved in Proposition 2, every skipper has incentives to share
his/her FADs; therefore, the Bayesian Nash equilibria we should observe in practice with
real-data is the one in which every vessel shares its FADs.
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Results in Table 4 show that each skipper enjoys more benefits than in the first
scenario, where the skipper did not share, and the firm also earns more than in the first
scenario, although less than in the second, as expected. The simulations performed thus
bear out the theoretical predictions described in the previous section, validating, with
real data, the benefits of this new procedure.
Table 4: Mechanism 2: Reassigning FADs with compensation
Skipper 1 Skipper 2 Skipper 3 Ship owner
1 $ 17,818 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 280,867
2 $ 17,818 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 265,994
3 $ 19,515 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 267,390
4 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 276,557
5 $ 17,818 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 284,488
6 $ 16,969 $ 18,666 $ 16,969 $ 257,283
7 $ 17,309 $ 18,723 $ 16,969 $ 267,492
8 $ 17,163 $ 19,062 $ 16,969 $ 267,834
9 $ 19,515 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 276,518
10 $ 16,969 $ 16,969 $ 17,818 $ 271,394
Avg. $ 17,786 $ 17,524 $ 17,054 $ 271,582
Diff 4.8% 3.3% 0.5% 7.9%
We used the nearest neighbor strategy to recover FADs during the simulations. This
means that FAD distribution was based on assigning FADs closer to each tuna vessel.
This is a quick and sound distribution method, commonly used by the tuna industry at
present, but it is far from optimal. The result may be improved further if this recovery
strategy changed to adapt to the dynamic nature of drifting FADs, as is shown in Groba
et al. (2018). In this case, it was proved that the quantity of miles traveled could be
reduced by 21.4% in the case of 3 vessels and 20 FADs per vessel in comparison with the
NN strategy, as we use in our approach. It not only indicates that the firm earns more,
due to the route optimization, but also that fishing time will be reduced, so skippers
can fish the same quantity in less time and still gain all the associated economic and
environmental benefits.
5 Conclusions
Taking our data into account, this paper proposes a new, coordinated way of working for
the tuna fishing companies related to FAD collection. Situated within the well-known
framework of game theory, our findings reflect the value of sharing FADs. We demonstrate
that, with the correct incentives, there is a situation in which all stakeholders, including
the company, skipper, and even the environment, obtain better results. Further, global
economic profits are realized for the fleet and company, and CO2 emissions are reduced.
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From a scholarly perspective, our work provides empirical evaluation using real data
and it supports and applies the adequacy of the proposed theoretical model –a non
cooperative game with incomplete information following the model of Aumann and
considering Bayesian Nash equilibria– to a complex, real-world situation. We assumed
two different situations: 1) reassigning FADs without compensation and 2) reassigning
FADs with compensation. While in the first situation, our results only corroborate
theoretical assumptions (and explain why tuna vessels work alone), the empirical portion
of the second situation complements the previous theoretical section. While, theoretically,
we could only predict that it was favorable to share FADs, the simulations performed
allow us to confirm this and verify that both the company and the skippers get more
benefits with this new procedure. Additionally, with our data, we can also estimate how
much more they each earn on average over time. We can therefore confirm that this
mechanism is suitable for the firm.
As the firm will enjoy savings due to the route optimization, tuna vessels will reduce
their fishing time and fuel consumed. In addition, fuel reduction presents another
important advantage: increased storage capacity. Benefits of sharing information between
vessels could inspire other non-tuna fisheries that are exploiting large fishing zones. This
paper opens up, therefore, a set of possibilities for a wide range of real-world problems.
Similarly, from a policy maker’s perspective, our work addresses a new, more-efficient
way to work with increasing FAD regulations regarding the number of FADs per PS.
These regulations were first introduced in the Indian Ocean by the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission (IOTC) with Resolution 19/02, they have since been extended to the rest
of the RFMOs (IATTC, ICCAT and WCPFC). It is essential, therefore, for the tuna
fishing industry to optimize the use of FADs. As it seems clear that this number will
be drastically reduced in the next few years, there is no other way but to use them as
efficiently as possible.
From an environmental perspective, our proposal would directly reduce the total
current CO2 emissions. This is a significant improvement, as climate change is one of the
main problems facing humanity today (Howard-Grenville, Buckle, Hoskins, & George,
2014). In addition, the development of more sustainable fishing methods using FADs
may be possible because of our research.
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A Appendix
We now introduce some well known concepts of non cooperative game theory. We refer
to Zamir (2013) for a detailed discussion of such concepts.
An Aumann model of incomplete information (Aumann (1976)) is a tuple(
I,X, (pii)i∈I , P
)
where I is the set of agents; X is the set of states of the world; for each i ∈ I, pii is a
partition of X; and P is a probability distribution over X (called common prior).
Given x ∈ X and i ∈ I we denote by pii (x) the element of pii to which x belongs to.
The interpretation is as follows. There is a possible set of states of the world (X)
and a probability distribution (P ) over X known by all agents. An element x ∈ X is
randomly selected according with P. Each agent i ∈ I has different information about
such element, which is given by pii. We assume that agent i knows that an element of
pii (x) has happened, but he/she can not distinguishes among the elements of pii (x).
The Harsanyi’s model of incomplete information (Harsanyi (1967) is more popular
than the Aumann’s model of incomplete information. In this paper we use Aumann’s
model because it fits better with the problem we are studying.
For each state of the world x ∈ X we consider the classical non-cooperative game
Γx =
(
I, (Axi )i∈I , (u
x
i )i∈I
)
played at this state. For each agent i ∈ I, Axi denotes the set
of pure actions that agent i can take when the state of the world is x. We assume that
Axi = A
x′
i when pii (x) = pii (x
′) . Besides uxi : ×i∈IA
x
i → R represents the utility of agent
i.
An strategy for agent i is a mapping σi assigning to each state of the world x ∈ X an
action σi (x) ∈ A
x
i such that σi (x) = σi (x
′) when pii (x) = pii (x
′) . We denote by Σi the
set of all strategies of agent i.
A Bayesian game on X is a triple
(
I, (Σi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I
)
where for each σ = (σi)i∈I and
each i ∈ N
ui (σ) =
∫
X
uxi
(
(σi (x))i∈I
)
dP
A Bayesian Nash equilibria (briefly BNE) is a tuple σ = (σi)i∈I such that for
for each i ∈ I and each σ′i ∈ Σi we have that ui (σ) ≥ ui (σ\σ
′
i) where σ\σ
′
i is the
combination of strategies where agent i plays σ′i and each agent j ∈ I\ {i} plays σj .
Intuitively, in a BNE at each stage of the world x each agent i is playing a best reply
against the strategies of the other agents. Thus, a BNE is an extension of the Nash
equilibria (Nash (1951)) to this setting.
We have included free school and poaching in our theoretical model (see section 3.2).
As we have mentioned above we are trying to incentivate skippers to share their FADs
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in such a way that all agents (the skippers and the firm) improve. Skippers must take
the decision (to share or not to share) with limited information. A skipper knows its
assigned FADS. Besides, the skipper knows that it is possible to obtain more catches
by poaching and free schools. What happens if the skipper decides to share? He will
obtain other FADS but the possibility of poaching and free school remains. With the
new FADs, such possibilities increase, decrease or remain the same? We assume that
remain the same because poaching and free schools is something that you can not know
in the moment in which the skipper takes the decision.
Suppose that vessel i has been assigned initially with FADs bi. The skipper of vessel
i decides to share and then it is assigned with FADs Bi.
In the initial situation the expected utility of the skipper is
p (niq + fs+ po)
whereas in the case of sharing it is
p (|Bi|q + fs+ po) .
Thus, the fact that the utility in case of sharing is larger or equal than in the initial
situation depends only on the FADs part of the utility of the skipper, namely, on niq
and |Bi|q.
Since in a BNE we only compare when the utility of a strategy is larger or equal than
the utility of other strategy, we will obtain the same BNE for all possible values of free
schools and poaching.
Thus, in order to simplify our technical results, we have decided to take fs = po = 0
in the rest of this Appendix.
A.1 Mechanism 1. Reassigning FADs without compensation
We consider the Aumann model of incomplete information
(
I,X, (pii)i∈I , P
)
defined as
follows.
• I = {f, 1, ..., n} where f is the firm and i denotes vessel i for each i = 1, ..., n.
In our simulations we will take 3 vessels. Namely, n = 3.
• X is the set of possible locations of the τ =
n∑
i=1
ni FADs assigned to the vessels.
Namely X = Zτ where Z denotes the set of places where a FAD can be located.
We assume that coordinates 1 to n1 from Z
τ refer to the position of the FADs
assigned to vessel 1. Coordinates n1 + 1 to n1 + n2 from Z
τ refer to the position of
the FADs assigned to vessel 2 and so on. A generic element of X will be denoted
as x = (xj)
τ
j=1 .
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In our simulations we take Z as the Indic Ocean. Besides each vessel will have 20
FADs (ni = 20 for all i ∈ N) and hence τ = 60.
• (pii)i∈I model the situation where each vessel only knows the position of its FADs
and the firm knows the position of all FADs.
Given i ∈ N and x, x′ ∈ X we have that pii (x) = pii (x
′) if and only if the position
of the FADs assigned to vessel i in x and x′ are the same. Namely, for each
j =
i−1∑
k=1
nk + 1, ...,
i∑
k=1
nk we have that xj = x
′
j .
For each x ∈ X, pif (x) = {x} .
• P is a probability distribution over X. We do not consider a specific distribution
for P because our theoretical results hold for any P.
The non-cooperative game Γx =
(
I, (Axi )i∈I , (u
x
i )i∈I
)
we consider is defined for
modelling the following situation. Each vessel, independently, decides if it share its
FADs with other vessels. If a vessel says no, then such vessel remains with the same
FADs. Among the vessels that say yes, the firm reassign the FADs of such vessels among
themselves. We now formalize this idea.
• I as above.
• (Axi )i∈I . For each i ∈ N, A
x
i = {Y ES,NO} .
Let Nx,Y ES the set of vessels that says Y ES. Let
Bx,Y ES =
⋃
i∈Nx,Y ES
ni⋃
k=1
bki
be the set of all FADs assigned initially to vessels that said Y ES.
Axf is the set of all possible reallocations of the FADs of B
x,Y ES among agents in
Nx,Y ES . Namely,
Axf =


(Bi)i∈Nx,Y ES : for each i ∈ N
x,Y ES , ∅ ⊂ Bi ⊂ B
x,Y ES ,⋃
i∈Nx,Y ES
Bi = B
x,Y ES and
Bi ∩Bj = ∅ for each i, j ∈ N
x,Y ES , i 6= j.


• (uxi )i∈I . Let (a
x
i )i∈I ∈ ×i∈IA
x
i .
Let j ∈ N be a vessel that said NO. Then, the vessel continue with the same FADs,
bj . Hence its utility is uj
(
(axi )i∈I
)
= pnjq.
Let j ∈ N be a vessel that said Y ES. Then, the vessel has a new set of FADs, Bj .
Hence its utility is uj
(
(axi )i∈I
)
= p |Bj | q where |Bj | denotes the number of FADs
in Bj .
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Finally, the utility of the firm is
uf
(
(axi )i∈I
)
= (pf − p)
n∑
i=1
njq − c
∑
i∈N\Nx,Y ES
d (bi)− c
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
d (Bi)
The utility of the firm has three parts. The first one, (pf − p)
n∑
i=1
njq, corresponds
to the benefits of selling the fish. This part is independent of the actions taking by
the vessels. The second one, −c
∑
i∈N\Nx,Y ES
d (bi) , corresponds to the cost of the
fuel of the vessels that did not share its FADs. This part depends on the actions
of the vessels but not on the action of the firm. The third one, −c
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
d (Bi) ,
corresponds to the cost of the fuel of the vessels that shared its FADs. This part
depends on the actions of the vessels and on the action of the firm.
We now make a theoretical analysis of the Bayesian game
(
I, (Σi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I
)
associ-
ated to this case.
Proposition 1. Let
(
I,X, (pii)i∈I , P
)
be the Aumann model of incomplete informa-
tion defined as above.
(a) Let σ = (σi)i∈I be such that for each i ∈ N and for each x ∈ X, σi (x) = NO.
Then, σ is a BNE of
(
I, (Σi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I
)
and for each i ∈ N, ui (σ) = pniq.
(b) Let σ = (σi)i∈I be a BNE of
(
I, (Σi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I
)
. Then, for each i ∈ N, ui (σ) =
pniq.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first note that for each i ∈ I and each σ = (σi)i∈I we
have that
ui (σ) =
∫
X
uxi
(
(σi (x))i∈I
)
dP =
∑
Xi∈pii
∫
Xi
uxi
(
(σi (x))i∈I
)
dP
and σi (x) = σi (x
′) for all x, x′ ∈ Xi.
(a) We have to prove that for each i ∈ I and each σ′i ∈ Σi, we have that ui (σ) ≥
ui (σ\σ
′
i) .
Let i = f. Since all vessels are saying NO, firm has nothing to do. Then, for each
σ′f ∈ Σf we have that uf (σ) = uf
(
σ\σ′f
)
.
Let i ∈ N and σ′i ∈ Σi. Thus,
ui
(
σ\σ′i
)
=
∑
Xi∈pii
∫
Xi
uxi
(
σ′i (x) , (σj (x))j∈I\{i}
)
dP.
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Let Xi ∈ pii be such that σ
′
i (x) = NO for each x ∈ Xi. Since σi (x) = NO for each
x ∈ Xi we have that∫
Xi
uxi
(
σ′i (x) , (σj (x))j∈I\{i}
)
dP =
∫
Xi
uxi
(
(σj (x))j∈I
)
dP.
Let Xi ∈ pii be such that σ
′
i (x) = Y ES for each x ∈ Xi. Thus, N
x,Y ES = {i} and
Bx,Y ES =
ni⋃
k=1
bki . Hence A
x
f , the set of all possible reallocations of the FADs of B
x,Y ES
among agents in Nx,Y ES has a unique element, namely, to assign all the FADs of vessel i
to vessel i. Thus,∫
Xi
uxi
(
σ′i (x) , (σj (x))j∈I\{i}
)
dP =
∫
Xi
uxi
(
(σj (x))j∈I
)
dP.
Hence,
ui
(
σ\σ′i
)
=
∑
Xi∈pii
∫
Xi
uxi
(
(σj (x))j∈I
)
dP = ui (σ) .
(b) We first prove a couple of statements that will be used in the proof of this part.
Statement 1. Let σ = (σi)i∈I be a BNE of
(
I, (Σi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I
)
. Then, there exists
X ′ ⊂ X such that
∫
X′
dP = 1 and for each x ∈ X ′, σf (x) = (B
∗
i )i∈Nx,Y ES where
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
d (B∗i ) = min


∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
d (Bi) : (Bi)i∈Nx,Y ES ∈ B
x,Y ES

 .
Proof of Statement 1. For each x ∈ X we denote σf (x) = (Bi)i∈Nx,Y ES . Besides, we
define X ′′ =
{
x ∈ X : σf (x) 6= (B
∗
i )i∈Nx,Y ES
}
.
Suppose that the statement does not hold. Then,
∫
X′′
dP > 0.
We now define σ′f such that σ
′
f (x) = (B
∗
i )i∈Nx,Y ES for all x ∈ X. Then
uf
(
σ\σ′f
)
=
∫
X
uxf
(
σ′f (x) , (σj (x))j∈I\{f}
)
dP
=
∫
X\X′′
uxf
(
σ′f (x) , (σj (x))j∈I\{f}
)
dP
+
∫
X′′
uxf
(
σ′f (x) , (σj (x))j∈I\{f}
)
dP.
Since σ′f (x) = σf (x) for all x ∈ X\X
′′ we have that∫
X\X′′
uxf
(
σ′f (x) , (σj (x))j∈I\{f}
)
dP =
∫
X\X′′
uxf
(
(σj (x))j∈I
)
dP.
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Besides, ∫
X′′
uxf
(
σ′f (x) , (σj (x))j∈I\{f}
)
dP
=
∫
X′′

(pf − p) n∑
i=1
njq − c
∑
i∈N\Nx,Y ES
d (bi)− c
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
d (B∗i )

 dP
>
∫
X′′

(pf − p) n∑
i=1
njq − c
∑
i∈N\Nx,Y ES
d (bi)− c
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
d (Bi)

 dP
=
∫
X′′
uxf
(
(σj (x))j∈I
)
dP.
Thus,
uf
(
σ\σ′f
)
>
∫
X\X′′
uxf
(
(σj (x))j∈I
)
dP +
∫
X′′
uxf
(
(σj (x))j∈I
)
dP
=
∫
X
uxf
(
(σj (x))j∈I
)
dP = uf (σ) ,
which contradicts that σ is a BNE. 
Statement 2. Let σ = (σi)i∈I be a BNE of
(
I, (Σi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I
)
. For each x ∈ X and
each i ∈ N such that
∫
pii(x)
dP > 0 we have that∫
x′∈pii(x)
ux
′
i
((
σi
(
x′
))
i∈I
)
dP ≥ pniq
∫
pii(x)
dP.
Proof of Statement 2. Let x ∈ X and i ∈ N such that
∫
pii(x)
dP > 0 and σi (x) = NO.
Then, vessel i receives its initial FADs and hence∫
x′∈pii(x)
ux
′
i
((
σi
(
x′
))
i∈I
)
dP =
∫
x′∈pii(x)
pniqdP = pniq
∫
pii(x)
dP.
Let x ∈ X and i ∈ N such that
∫
pii(x)
dP > 0 and σi (x) = Y ES. Suppose not. Then,∫
x′∈pii(x)
ux
′
i
((
σi
(
x′
))
i∈I
)
dP < pniq
∫
pii(x)
dP.
Let σ′i be such that σ
′
i (x
′) = NO when x′ ∈ pii (x) and σ
′
i (x
′) = σi (x
′) otherwise.
Now,
ui
(
σ\σ′i
)
=
∑
Xi∈pii
∫
x′∈Xi
ux
′
i
(
σ′i
(
x′
)
,
(
σj
(
x′
))
j∈I\{i}
)
dP
=
∑
Xi∈pii\pii(x)
∫
x′∈Xi
ux
′
i
(
σ′i
(
x′
)
,
(
σj
(
x′
))
j∈I\{i}
)
dP
+
∫
x′∈pii(x)
ux
′
i
(
σ′i
(
x′
)
,
(
σj
(
x′
))
j∈I\{i}
)
dP
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Since σ′i (x
′) = σi (x
′) when x′ ∈ Xi ∈ pii\pii (x) we have that
∑
Xi∈pii\pii(x)
∫
x′∈Xi
ux
′
i
(
σ′i
(
x′
)
,
(
σj
(
x′
))
j∈I\{i}
)
dP =
∑
Xi∈pii\pii(x)
∫
x′∈Xi
ux
′
i
((
σj
(
x′
))
j∈I
)
dP.
Since uxi
(
σ′i (x
′) , (σj (x
′))
j∈I\{i}
)
= pniq when x
′ ∈ pii (x) we have that
∫
x′∈pii(x)
ux
′
i
(
σ′i
(
x′
)
,
(
σj
(
x′
))
j∈I\{i}
)
dP = pniq
∫
pii(x)
dP
>
∫
x′∈pii(x)
ux
′
i
((
σi
(
x′
))
i∈I
)
dP.
Thus,
ui
(
σ\σ′i
)
>
∑
Xi∈pii\pii(x)
∫
x′∈Xi
ux
′
i
((
σj
(
x′
))
j∈I
)
dP +
∫
x′∈pii(x)
ux
′
i
((
σi
(
x′
))
i∈I
)
dP
= ui (σ) ,
which contradicts that σ is a BNE. 
We now prove (b) . We know that
ui (σ) =
∑
Xi∈pii
∫
Xi
uxi
(
(σi (x))i∈I
)
dP =
∑
Xi∈pii:
∫
Xi
dP>0
∫
Xi
uxi
(
(σi (x))i∈I
)
dP
By statement 2,
∑
Xi∈pii:
∫
Xi
dP>0
∫
Xi
uxi
(
(σi (x))i∈I
)
dP ≥ pniq
∑
Xi∈pii:
∫
Xi
dP>0
∫
Xi
dP.
Since P is a probability,
∫
X
dP = 1. Then,
pniq
∑
Xi∈pii:
∫
Xi
dP>0
∫
Xi
dP = pniq
∫
X
dP = pniq.
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Besides,
n∑
i=1
ui (σ) =
n∑
i=1
∫
X
uxi
(
(σi (x))i∈I
)
dP =
∫
X
n∑
i=1
uxi
(
(σi (x))i∈I
)
dP
=
∫
X

 ∑
i∈N\Nx,Y ES
pniq +
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
p |Bi| q

 dP
= pq
∫
X

 ∑
i∈N\Nx,Y ES
ni +
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
ni

 dP
= pq
∫
X
[∑
i∈N
ni
]
dP = pq
∑
i∈N
ni
=
∑
i∈N
pniq.
Since ui (σ) ≥ pniq for each i ∈ N and
n∑
i=1
ui (σ) =
∑
i∈N
pniq we deduce that ui (σ) =
pniq for each i ∈ N.
Proposition 1 says nothing about the utility obtained by the firm. Thus, a natural
question that arises is the following: is it possible to find BNE where some vessels share
its FADs? Notice that if the answer is YES, then the firm can improve its utility by the
fuel’s savings.
Next examples show that the answer depends on P and the location of the FADs.
Example 1. Consider the case where we have two vessels (I = {f, a, b}) and each
vessels has two FADs. Besides every vessel knows the location of every FAD. Namely, P
assign probability 1 to element x =
(
b1a, b
2
a, b
1
b , b
2
b
)
and zero to the rest of elements of X.
The distances between the FADs and the vessels are the following:
distances 1 2 b1a b
2
a b
1
b
2 50
b1a 5 45
b2a 35 15 30
b1b 15 35 10 20
b2b 45 5 40 10 30
The distances are computed by assuming that vessels are located in a line. From left
to right 1 [5] b1a [10] b
1
b [20] b
2
a [10] b
2
b [5] 2. The distance between vessel 1 and FADs b
1
a is 5;
the distance between FADs b1a and b
1
b is 10 and so on.
Let σ be the BNE where each vessel says NO. Then, each vessels recover its FADs.
Vessel a moves to FAD b2a (distance 5), next to FAD b
2
a (distance 30) and then back (35).
The total distance traveled is 70. Similarly, the distance traveled by vessel b is also 70.
Then, the utility of each vessel is 2pq and the utility of the firm is (pf − p) 4q − c140.
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Let σ be such that each vessel says Y ES and the firm assign FADs b1a and b
1
b to vessel
a and FADs b2a and b
2
b to vessel b. It is easy to see that σ is a BNE. Besides the utility of
the firm is (pf − p) 4q − c60. Thus, in this BNE the firm can improve with respect to the
initial situation.
Example 2. Consider the same case as in Example 1 but now the distances between
the FADs and the vessels are the following:
distances 1 2 b1a b
2
a b
1
b
2 140
b1a 5 135
b2a 105 15 120
b1b 125 35 100 20
b2b 135 5 110 10 30
The distances are computed by assuming that vessels are located in a line. From left
to right 1 [5] b1a [100] b
1
b [20] b
2
a [10] b
2
b [5] 2.
In this example the unique BNE is the one where each vessel says NO. Notice that if
both vessels say Y ES then the firm assign FAD b1a to vessel a and the other FADs to
vessel b. Thus, vessel a is better saying NO than saying Y ES.
A.2 Mechanism 2. Reassigning FADs with compensation
We now introduce the theoretical model for analyzing this case. The Aumann model of
incomplete information
(
I,X, (pii)i∈I , P
)
associated to this case is the same as above.
The non-cooperative game Γx =
(
I, (Axi )i∈I , (u
x
i )i∈I
)
we consider is defined bas
follows. (Axi )i∈I is the same as in Case 1. Nevertheless (u
x
i )i∈I will be modified in
order to consider the compensation that firm give to vessels that share its FADs. Let
(axi )i∈I ∈ ×i∈IA
x
i .
Let j ∈ N be a vessel that said NO (namely axj = NO). Then, the vessel continue
with the same FADs, bi. Hence its utility is uj
(
(axi )i∈I
)
= pnjq. This utility is the same
as in Mechanism 1.
Let j ∈ N be a vessel that said Y ES (namely axj = Y ES). Then, the vessel has a
new set of assigned FADs, Bj . Hence its utility is
uj
(
(axi )i∈I
)
= pmax {|Bj | , nj} q
where |Bj | denotes the number of FADs in Bj . Notice that if vessel j receives at least nj
FADs, then it will be paid according with the FADs received. If vessel j receives less
than nj , then it will be paid as if the vessel receives nj FADs. In this part appears clearly
the new incentive mechanism.
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Finally, the utility of the firm uf
(
(axi )i∈I
)
is given by
(pf − p)
n∑
i=1
njq − c
∑
i∈N\Nx,Y ES
d (bi)− c
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
d (Bi)−
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES ,|Bi|<ni
p (ni − |Bi|) q
The utility of the firm has four parts. The first one, (pf − p)
n∑
i=1
njq, the second
one, −c
∑
i∈N\Nx,Y ES
d (bi) , and the third one, −c
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
d (Bi) , are the same as in the
previous case. In this case it appears a fourth one,
−
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES ,|Bi|<ni
p (ni − |Bi|) q,
where it appears the compensation that the firm gives to the vessels that say Y ES and
receive less FADs than initially.
We now make a theoretical analysis of the Bayesian game
(
I, (Σi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I
)
associ-
ated to this case.
Proposition 2. Let
(
I,X, (pii)i∈I , P
)
be the Aumann model of incomplete informa-
tion defined as above.
(a) Let σNO =
(
σNOi
)
i∈I
be such that for each i ∈ N and for each x ∈ X, σNOi (x) =
NO. Then, σNO is a BNE of
(
I, (Σi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I
)
and for each i ∈ N, ui
(
σNO
)
= pniq.
(b) Let i ∈ N and x ∈ X. We define ax,Y ESi = Y ES and a
x,NO
i = NO. For each(
axj
)
j∈I
∈ ×i∈IA
x
i we have that
∫
x′∈pii(x)
ux
′
i
(
a
x,Y ES
i ,
(
axj
)
j∈I\{i}
)
dP ≥
∫
x′∈pii(x)
ux
′
i
(
a
x,NO
i ,
(
axj
)
j∈I\{i}
)
dP.
(c) There exists a BNE σY ES =
(
σY ESi
)
i∈I
of
(
I, (Σi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I
)
where for each i ∈ N
and for each x ∈ X, σY ESi (x) = Y ES. Besides, for each i ∈ I, ui
(
σY ES
)
≥ ui
(
σNO
)
.
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) It is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 (a) .
(b) We know that for each x′ ∈ pii (x) and each
(
axj
)
j∈I
∈ ×i∈IA
x
i
ux
′
i
(
a
x,NO
i ,
(
axj
)
j∈I\{i}
)
= pniq and
ux
′
i
(
a
x,Y ES
i ,
(
axj
)
j∈I\{i}
)
= pmax
{
ni,
∣∣∣Bx′i ∣∣∣} q
where Bx
′
i is the set of FADs assigned to vessel i after saying Y ES. Thus, the result
holds trivially.
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(c) For each x ∈ X we take σY ESf (x) = (B
∗
i )i∈Nx,Y ES where
c
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
d (B∗i ) +
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES ,|Bi|<ni
p (ni − |B
∗
i |) q
= min

c
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES
d (Bi) +
∑
i∈Nx,Y ES ,|Bi|<ni
p (ni − |Bi|) q : (Bi)i∈Nx,Y ES ∈ B
x,Y ES


We first prove that σY ES is a BNE. We need to prove that for each i ∈ I and each
σi ∈ Σi we have that ui
(
σY ES
)
≥ ui
(
σY ES\σi
)
.
Because of the definition of σY ESf it is clear that for any σf ∈ Σf , uf
(
σY ES
)
≥
uf
(
σY ES\σf
)
.
Let i ∈ N and σi ∈ Σi. In the proof of Proposition 1 we have seen that
ui
(
σY ES
)
=
∑
Xi∈pii
∫
Xi
uxi
((
σY ESi (x)
)
i∈I
)
dP.
Let Xi ∈ pii be such that σi (x) = Y ES when x ∈ Xi. Then, σ
Y ES
i (x) = σi (x) and
hence, ∫
Xi
uxi
((
σY ESi (x)
)
i∈I
)
dP =
∫
Xi
uxi
(
σi (x) ,
(
σY ESi (x)
)
i∈I\{i}
)
dP.
Let Xi ∈ pii be such that σi (x) = NO when x ∈ Xi. By part (b),∫
Xi
uxi
((
σY ESi (x)
)
i∈I
)
dP ≥
∫
Xi
uxi
(
σi (x) ,
(
σY ESi (x)
)
i∈I\{i}
)
dP.
Thus,
ui
(
σY ES
)
≥
∑
Xi∈pii
∫
Xi
uxi
(
σi (x) ,
(
σY ESi (x)
)
i∈I\{i}
)
dP = ui
(
σY ES\σi
)
.
We now prove that for each i ∈ I, ui
(
σY ES
)
≥ ui
(
σNO
)
. Using part (b) it is
straightforward to prove that for each i ∈ N, ui
(
σY ES
)
≥ ui
(
σNO
)
.
Since no vessel share its FADs in σNO we have that for each x ∈ X,
uxf
(
σNO
)
= (pf − p)
n∑
i=1
njq − c
∑
i∈N
d (bi)
and hence
uf
(
σNO
)
=
∫
X
uxf
(
σNO
)
dP = (pf − p)
n∑
i=1
njq − c
∑
i∈N
d (bi) .
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We know that
uf
(
σY ES
)
= (pf − p)
n∑
i=1
njq − c
∑
i∈N
d (B∗i )−
∑
i∈N,|Bi|<ni
p (ni − |B
∗
i |) q
where {B∗i }
n
i=1 is obtained through the minimization problem defined above.
Thus, for proving that uf
(
σY ES
)
≥ uf
(
σNO
)
is enough to prove that it exists
{Bi}
n
i=1 such that
c
∑
i∈N
d (Bi) +
∑
i∈N,|Bi|<ni
p (ni − |Bi|) q ≤ c
∑
i∈N
d (bi) .
If we take Bi = bi for all i = 1, ..., n we realize that the previous inequality holds. 
Next example shows that in some cases, the BNE of parts (a) and (c) could be, in a
practical way, the same. Nevertheless our simulations based on real-data will show that
both BNE could be very different.
Example 3. Consider the same case as in Example 1 but now the distances between
the FADs and the vessels are the following:
distances 1 2 b1a b
2
a b
1
b
2 120
b1a 5 115
b2a 10 110 5
b1b 110 10 105 100
b2b 115 5 105 10 5
The distances are computed by assuming that vessels are located in a line. From left
to right 1 [5] b11 [15] b
2
1 [100] b
1
2 [5] b
2
2 [5] 2.
In the BNE described in part (a) each vessels recover its FADs. Then, the utility of
each vessel is 2pq and the utility of the firm is (pf − p) 4q− c40. In the BNE described in
part (c) each vessels share its FADs. Then the firm reassign all FADs. But the optimal
solution is to assign to each vessel its initial FADs. Then, every vessel recover its FADs.
Hence, the utility of each vessel is 2pq and the utility of the firm is (pf − p) 4q − c40.
Even from a theoretical point of view both equilibria are different, in a practical way,
both are the same.
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